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Risk Perceptions and Risk Management Approaches of Chinese Overseas 
Investors: An Empirical Investigation  
 
Abstract 
This paper presents empirical evidence on how Chinese firms perceive and tackle risks 
associated with their overseas investments. Using a first-hand survey dataset of Chinese firms 
who invest abroad, we depict variations in (1) the levels of different types of perceived risk, 
and (2) the risk management approaches taken by these firms. These variations are assessed 
with respect to three prominent factors: firm ownership structure, investment motives, and the 
host country institutional quality. Our evidence uncovers a significant degree and pattern of 
heterogeneity in the strategic behaviour of Chinese investors in risky environments. 
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1. Introduction 
Investing overseas is a risky business. This is particularly the case for investors from a 
transitional economy such as China which may be less familiar with overseas markets than 
their counterparts from industrialised economies. This paper attempts to investigate the 
perceptions of overseas investment risks by Chinese firms and the influencing factors behind 
the perceived risks. Specifically, this paper strives to provide answers to the following 
research question: What are the different types of risk faced by Chinese firms in overseas 
markets, and how do these perceived risks, and management approaches to risk, differ across 
firm ownership, destination institutional quality and investment motives?  
In addressing this question, the concept of risk perception follows the common definition in 
the literature of risk management and other disciplines, i.e. judgments made by individuals or 
organisations when they are asked to characterise and evaluate hazardous activities and 
factors (Slovic 1987). Our focus on (subjective) risk reception as opposed to (objective) 
actual risks enables us to explore the heterogeneity in firms’ evaluations of their overseas 
investment even when they are facing similar political and economic environment, thus 
shedding light on the underlying firm-level decision-making process.    
The practical prominence of this question is evident in China’s ever-growing interest in 
expanding its economic influence on a global scale. In particular, commencing from its Tenth 
Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), a legacy of Soviet-style national development agenda, China’s 
“Go Global” policy emphasised a strengthening of the country’s position in overseas direct 
investments (ODI), and was highlighted in its recent global-reaching economic ambition - 
mostly notably the “Belt and Road” Initiative.1 With a strong supporting hand from the 
government, not too surprisingly, China’s non-financial ODI has increased exponentially 
from US$6.9 billion in 2001 (Davies 2013) to a staggering US$118.02 billion in 2016 
(MOFCOM 2016), placing the country at the head of the world foreign investment rankings 
(refer to, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2016, p. 6). Researchers and 
economic analysts also forecast that China will become the world’s largest economy after 
2020 (Batten & Szilagyi 2016).  
                                                          
1 The “Belt and Road” project was launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013 and focuses on exploring and 
improving new business opportunities and trading links between China and the rest of the world. The project 
includes six economic corridors passing through over 60 countries across Asia, Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa. These economic corridor are the: (1) New Eurasian Land Bridge; (2) China-Mongolia-Russia Corridor; 
(3) China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor; (4) China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor; (5) China-Pakistan 
Corridor; and the (6) Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor (Eurasia News Online, 2017). 
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Chinese firms have of course been subjected to a range of research on their ODI activities 
(Liu et al. 2008, Lu et al. 2014; Ramasamy et al. 2012; Liu et al. 2014). However, this paper 
develops a combined-factor risk perspective on the specific confluence of the role, interaction 
and influence of three key factors which underpin the market risk perceptions of overseas 
investors.  
This study is facilitated via access to a survey dataset on Chinese firms. Significantly, the 
paper looks at the conjunction of risk factors (i.e. pertaining to ownership, institutional 
quality and investment motives) and the implications of this. It complements the extant 
literature in a range of ways. First, this study builds a link between ODI and risk management 
from the perspective of the investing firms’ perception about destination markets. Despite the 
fact that ODI is subject to various ongoing types of risks in different markets, risk 
management in the process of internationalisation (particularly for Chinese ODI), is relatively 
underdeveloped in current international business literature. The existing body of literature, 
nevertheless, suggests that, in the context of ODI, political turmoil in the target region 
reduces the likelihood of internationalisation, and also the acquisition of political knowledge 
about the target market reduces uncertainty (Hilmersson et al. 2015). Liesch et al. (2011), 
recognising that risk factors can vary for differing firms in different markets, advocate further 
empirical insight into this issue as part of a move towards the adoption by the international 
business literature of a more holistic approach towards risk identification and management. 
The present study responds to this call. This approach is particularly pertinent, and indeed 
imperative, in the aftermath and ongoing consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Risk management has received increasing attention from academics and policy makers, with 
a heightened focus on particular categories of risk faced in the internationalisation process 
including: economic and political risks; cultural differences; and, changes in customer need. 
(Hilmersson et al. 2015). The prescience of these risk factors was responded to by regulatory 
changes in some developed countries, The UK Corporate Governance Code of 2014, for 
example, requires that: “directors should confirm in the annual report that they have carried 
out a robust assessment of the principal risks facing the company, including those that would 
threaten its business model, future performance, solvency or liquidity” (Financial Reporting 
Council 2014). Consequently, risk reporting in the annual reports of listed firms around the 
world has increased significantly and firms now disclose information about the different 
types of risks, changes in their risk exposure, and how risks are managed or mitigated.  
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In the context of Chinese ODI, overseas investment risks also prompt new risk management 
mechanisms to safeguard overseas investment. At the macro-level, the Chinese government 
attempts to reduce potential risks associated with ODI through signing “mutual protection 
agreements” with other countries. At the micro-level, the China’s People’s Insurance 
Company provides personal accident insurance subsidies for overseas working expatriates 
(Luo et al. 2010, p.76). Furthermore, to facilitate ODI, the Chinese government regularly 
collects data on the problems that investors face in the overseas market and these are 
published in the “Obstacles Report Rules on Investment in Different Countries” (Luo et al. 
2010). Together, these efforts work to provide a platform for potential Chinese investors in 
assessing their overseas investment destinations and making investment decisions according 
to their own risk preferences. Nevertheless, thus far, thorough empirical assessments of the 
risk exposure of Chinese ODI are scarce, with an exception being Buckley et al. (2007) and 
Han et al. (2018) who provide some valuable insights. They state that Chinese ODI is 
strongly associated with countries exhibiting higher political risk, and that much of the ODI 
in politically risky countries is partly driven by the close political ties between China and the 
host countries. Therefore, our exploration of the specific risks associated with Chinese 
investments as well as the influencing channels would build on and therefore significantly 
enrich this line of research. 
 
Second, this paper looks explicitly at firm ownership and its effects on a firm’s self-reported 
investment motives in the context of ODI risk perception, offering the first evidence on the 
conditionality of ODI risk perceptions and risk management approaches in respect of firm 
ownership background and ODI motives. This novel angle is pertinent given the observation 
that, hitherto, a significant amount of Chinese overseas investment has been, and is being 
developed, through government investment initiatives, namely: the China “Belt and Road” 
strategy (see Figure 1), overseas mergers and acquisitions (M&A), foreign contract projects – 
including projects initiated through built-operate-transfer (BOT), built-own-operate projects 
(BOO), and public-private partnerships (PPP) (MOFCOM 2016). The existing empirical 
research on Chinese ODI has established some general evidence on: the determinants and 
motivations of ODI (Buckley et al. 2007; Zhang & Daly 2011); the choice of ODI locations 
(Ramasamy et al. 2012); ODI in emerging markets (Chen et al. 2015); ODI in developed 
countries (Chen & Tang 2014); ODI by Chinese public firms (Hu & Cui 2014); Chinese 
multinationals (Deng 2004); and, private enterprises (Huang & Renyong 2014). Our 
investigation focuses on the role of ownership structure and investment motives in relation to 
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risk and points to the importance of stakeholders (in particular government background) and 
ODI drives for understanding ODI behaviour originating from a transitional economy.   
[Figure 1 inserted here] 
Third, our focus on destination market institutional quality (and its interacted effect with firm 
ownership) aligns closely with the notion of institutional environment in the academic 
literature. Within the international business commentary, in particular, the degrees and 
extremes of this issue have been signalled through, for example, the notion of institutional 
voids, namely the: “absence of specialized intermediaries, regulatory systems, and contract-
enforcing mechanisms in emerging markets” (Khanna et al. 2005, p. 4). Institutional voids 
occur in an extensive range of varieties and contexts depending on the given national context 
under examination (Mair et al. 2012; Zhou et al. 2016). In the case of Chinese overseas 
investment, as firms go abroad, their business models with “Chinese characteristics” (that are 
uncommon for western firms) are often faced with unprecedented challenges in dynamic 
institutional environments (Fang, 1999; Gammeltoft et al. 2012), raising a host of challenges 
for conventional business models. Owing to the paucity of disaggregated data, the literature 
nevertheless offers a more holistic approach in understanding the relationship between 
country-level socio-economic factors and the pattern of Chinese ODI without offering much 
information about how the institutional environment interacts with firm-level characteristics. 
An investigation of how Chinese firms of different backgrounds perceive and respond to the 
risk factors in other markets would therefore fill this gap with evidence from a micro-level. 
Finally, the design of our study allows identification of perceived market risks for individual 
firms. Prior research on Chinese ODI utilises both country-level macroeconomic indicators 
(Buckley et al. 2007) and firm-level data (Ramasamy et al. 2012; Chen & Tang 2014; Hu & 
Cui 2014; Huang & Renyong 2014; Chen et al. 2015) to explore the patterns and 
determinants of ODI. Discussing the prescient issues in the emerging market research, 
Kearney (2012) provides a succinct overview of the risks involved in the internationalisation 
process, which includes: complexity in contracts’ enforcements; protection of patents; 
governances and compliance costs; higher degree of uncertainty relating to foreign exchange 
movements; taxation policies, and political challenges in the overseas destinations. While 
these studies have extensively investigated how the local and overseas institutional 
environments determine and facilitate the flow of Chinese ODI, it is nevertheless not clear 
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how risk factors play a role. However, the international business literature has employed risk 
indices to measure country-level risk. For instance, Brown et al. (2015) introduce the 
Robinson Country Risk Index (RCRI), a tool which incorporates four broad dimensions—
Governance, Economics, Operations, and Society (GEOS). These risk-related indices provide 
a very generic overview about the risk profile of a country, and hence the potential risks 
associated with different countries are not further decomposed into sub-categories. This 
makes it difficult for ODI-seeking firms to understand what specific type of risk would be 
more pertinent to their investment should they decide to enter the international market. From 
a behavioural economics point of view, firms make investment decisions based on their own 
subjective perception of risks formed through the utilisation of both public and private 
information. This facilitates using “perception” instead of employing a homogenous measure 
of country-level risk, and enables the study to capture not only the heterogeneity in individual 
perception, but also to uncover the relationship between the macro-level politico-economic 
environment and the firm-level risk perception at the actual level where investment decisions 
are made. Thus, our analysis of firm heterogeneity in ownership and investment motives 
reveals a fuller picture and finer details of the links which are often masked in more 
aggregate level studies.     
The rest of our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, key hypotheses are developed as 
benchmark guidance for our empirical examination. Section 3 describes the survey data and 
the estimation strategy employed in this research. In Section 4, we analyse our findings 
drawn from our sample of surveyed Chinese ODI firms. Section 5 concludes the paper and 
offers some interpretation of the results in a broader context.   
2. Conceptual development and hypotheses  
Much of the mainstream ODI research on the determinants and motives of ODI has applied 
Dunning’s Ownership-Location-Internationalisation framework, which suggests three general 
motives of foreign direct investment, namely: (a) market-seeking, resources-seeking 
(including strategic assets-seeking), and efficiency-seeking (Dunning 2006a). These theories 
are developed mainly in the Western context but have been widely used to examine ODI 
from the emerging economies, including China. Questioning the traditional theories relating 
to ODI, Buckley et al. (2007) argue that China has a unique regulatory and governance 
environment where capital market imperfections encourage the availability of capital on 
better terms and conditions (for example, lower interest rates) for state-owned enterprises. 
We argue that an agency theory framework, originating from economics and finance, could 
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also provide a useful theoretical lens with which to explore the nature of ODI for Chinese 
firms with different ownership structures (i.e. state-owned vs. private owned). The motives of 
ODI are important determinants in making decisions about ODI, but we argue that such 
decisions are affected by the governance arrangements (i.e. the ownership structures of 
firms). For example, in Chinese state-owned enterprises, the principal-agent issues are likely 
to be significant compared with the private enterprises, and hence, a potential conflict of 
interests between owners and managers may also have implications towards the risk-taking 
behaviour of a firm. We therefore combine the assumptions relating to the motives of ODI 
together with the assumptions of agency theory and we argue that different ownership 
structure may lead to different motives and risk initiatives.  
The concepts of ‘risk and uncertainty’ are often used interchangeably in the international 
business literature (Buckley et al. 2016; Han et al. 2018). For the purpose of this research, we 
define risk as the possibility that events will turn out differently than anticipated (Miller & 
Lessard 2007). We argue that national culture influences risk-taking behaviour of individuals 
and firms (Schneider et al. 2017). Chinese firms engaging in international trade do use 
financial derivatives to cover against fluctuations in exchange rates (Fei 2012). In particular, 
after the launching of the ‘Belt and Road’ initiative and subsequent internationalisation of 
Chinese RMB, financial derivatives are now valued as one of the important risk management 
tools by both local and overseas firms trading in China. Empirical evidence shows that the 
use of derivatives reduces a firm’s risk exposure and increase firm value (Bartram et al. 
2011). After the liberalisation of the Chinese financial markets, state regulators, such as the 
China Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the domestic stock exchanges 
have played an important role in facilitating the use of such derivatives (International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association 2017).  
Similarly, regulatory bodies around the world also require public listed firms to use a robust 
internal control and risk management system. Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is one of 
the risk management approaches that responds to the identification and management of 
corporate risk exposure. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) defines ERM as: ‘...a process, affected by an entity’s board of 
directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the 
enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to 
be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
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entity objectives.’2 The COSO framework is used in the international business literature in 
assessing ERM strategies for global megaprojects (Kardes et al. 2013). We use the 
fundamental ERM framework developed by COSO in identifying the perceived level of risks 
faced by the Chinese firms. We also argue that a single universal theory may not fully capture 
the complex issues involved in the internationalisation of firms and hence, this research 
employs these multiple theoretical perspectives in exploring the risk perceptions of Chinese 
firms. In the next section, we develop our hypotheses concerning the perceived level of risks 
for firms with different ownership structures and motives.  
2.1. Ownership structure and ODI risks 
Managers and shareholders are generally concerned about a number of risks and uncertainties 
in overseas destinations. ODI are conventionally required to “go through” a tough screening 
process in identifying and assessing any institutional voids (Khanna et al. 2005), potential 
risks and uncertainties relating to ODI. In the contemporary era, Chinese ODI are operated 
by: individuals; foreign financial institutions; private enterprises; and, state-owned enterprises 
(hereafter SOEs). Until 2003, the Chinese private sector was not allowed to participate in 
ODI, and owing to such restrictions, the share of private ODI in China accounted for only 1 
per cent of total ODI between 2003 and 2008. In a recent exploratory study (Huang & 
Renyong, 2014) of ODI activity by privately-owned enterprise (hereafter POEs) in Zhejiang 
Province in China found that POEs are increasingly active in exploring overseas markets. 
This is due to the unfavourable local institutional environment which tends to support SOEs 
over their private counterparts. For example, it is relatively difficult for Chinese POEs to get 
financial support from Chinese banks because banks are largely owned by the state and 
lending to POEs is often considered too high risk (Morck et al. 2008). Moreover, SOEs are 
traditionally considered to be the fundamental pillars of the Chinese economy and corporate 
regulations in China are purposely developed to support the SOEs (Huang & Renyong 2014).  
The degree to which shares in an organisation are majority-owned raises agency problems 
between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. According to recent statistics from 
the China Securities and Regulatory Commission, the total number of listed private firms on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange reached 2,613, with a market capitalisation of 
RMB 37.25 trillion and ranking it as the second largest in the world after the United States 
                                                          
2 For further details about COSO risk management framework, refer to COSO’s Enterprise Risk 
Management – Integrated Framework (2004) at http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/ 
COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf   
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(China Securities and Regulatory Commission 2014). Around 30 per cent of shares in the 
listed firms are owned by the Chinese government (Chen et al. 2006). In the case of SOEs, 
the ownership is generally held by the central, provincial, city and local government (Morck 
et al. 2008). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large blockholders in a concentrated 
ownership structure could be valuable facilitators in effectively allocating corporate 
resources, as compared with a dispersed ownership structure with its frequent attendant free-
rider issues. However, in the context of China, the concentrated ownership structure in SOEs 
creates particular agency problems which centre on a principal-principal conflict,3 suggesting 
a conflict of interests between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Clarke 
2003). It can be argued that agency problems are likely to result in sub-optimal decision 
making, having economic implications for firms engaged in the international business. In 
contrast, POEs are considered to be relatively more efficient in the allocation of resources 
owing to less agency issues in such organisations. 
However, Buckley et al. (2007) argue that Chinese SOEs are likely to access capital on better 
terms and conditions (i.e. below market interest rates) which allow them to invest in high risk 
projects. The significant influence of the Chinese government may also push SOEs to invest 
according to the objectives of the state and hence they may invest in countries which are 
politically affiliated, or considered to be the close ally, of the Chinese government. The 
international business literature also indicates that state ownership has a significant influence 
on the internationalisation of emerging market enterprises (EMEs) (Hong et al. 2015). On the 
other hand, POEs, which are likely to have a more limited availability of funds, are more 
likely to invest carefully when opting for ODI. A weaker legal and institutional environment, 
or indeed even the possibility of an institutional void, in the overseas markets exposes ODI to 
a number of unique risks, such as, for example: political risk; exchange rate volatility 
(Buckley et al. 2007); weak government efficiency (leading to corruption); complex tax 
systems; and, different labour laws and labour unions (Huang & Renyong 2014). Chen et al. 
(2015) found that Western ODI is largely allocated in countries with stronger regulatory 
environments (defined by the home countries’ rule of law/proprietary rights), while Chinese 
ODI is equally allocated between strong and poor institutional governance environments. The 
extant empirical literature on Chinese ODI suggests that POEs are generally risk averse 
                                                          
3 The agency theory, which is one of the most cited theories in economics and finance (Jensen & Meckling 
1976), raises the issue of principal(owner)-agent(manager) conflicts in modern corporations with dispersed 
ownership structures. In a concentrated ownership structure, in addition to the traditional principal-agent 
problems, a conflict of interests between principal (majority shareholders) and principal (minority shareholders) 
could also have adverse implications on corporate decision making.    
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compared with their state-owned counterparts (Liu et al. 2008). As POEs are less exposed to 
the overseas markets, and, owing to their risk-averse nature, we expect that that the perceived 
level of ODI risk will be higher for SOEs compared to the POEs. We also argue that easy 
access to credit by SOEs, coupled with principal-agent problems, in SOEs may lead to a 
choice of high risk investment destinations. We therefore develop the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  POEs have a lower perceived risk, regarding ODI, than SOEs.  
2.2. The perceived level of risks for different ODI motives   
Dunning’s paradigm explains that overseas investments from developed countries are driven 
by market-seeking, efficiency-seeking, and resources-seeking motives (Dunning 2006b). 
Chinese ODI, which is often both politically and economically-oriented (Wei 2010), 
potentially aims variously to achieve each of these objectives. The market-seeking motives 
involve expanding distribution networks and facilitating the exports of domestic producers 
(Buckley et al. 2007). This involves supplying an established line of products to the market 
of a particular country (Dunning 2008). Chinese firms achieve these objectives by 
establishing industrial parks and shopping malls in other countries – the industrial park 
approach tends to be used for large scale manufacturing, and the shopping mall approach is 
particularly used by small scale retailers (Huang & Renyong 2014). Indeed, the size of a 
domestic market plays a crucial role and rapidly growing emerging economies are more 
attractive for Chinese firms in terms of increasing their market shares and profit margins 
(Buckley et al. 2007). The liberalisation of Chinese domestic market has resulted in higher 
foreign direct investment and competition in certain industries, especially, in the textile 
sector. As a result of economies of scale arising from large scale production and owing to 
lower profit margins in the domestic markets, Chinese firms have started exploring overseas 
markets. The takeover and acquisition of foreign companies is another route by which to 
sustain existing market or seek new markets for Chinese firms (Dunning 2008).    
On the other hand, efficiency-seeking (cost reduction) motives, which often do not describe 
the core objectives of Chinese ODI, seek to minimise the cost of production. However, a 
gradual increase in the production costs (particularly the costs of land, and labour) in China 
provides opportunities for Chinese investors to move their operations from relatively 
expensive eastern regions of China to the western areas, and also to less developed 
neighbouring markets, such as Bangladesh and Cambodia (Huang & Renyong 2014).  
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In contrast to the above two types of motivation, resource-seeking/strategic asset-seeking is a 
more debated incentive and widely believed to be one of the fundamental objectives of 
Chinese ODI (Buckley et al. 2007; Ramasamy et al. 2012; Huang & Renyong 2014). This 
involves, for example, investments in countries with large reserves of natural resources 
(Zhang & Daly, 2011), including developed markets (Australia and Canada) and countries 
with high political risks (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan). 4  Investment in such higher risk destinations which possess weaker legal, 
political regimes are more vulnerable to the different types of risks alluded to in the argument 
above. Indeed, only SOEs can generally afford to meet the larger capital requirements for 
such politically-driven investments in these risk-prone destinations. The Chinese investment 
in natural resources in Africa has been frequently criticised for not “being mutually 
beneficial”, as many Chinese firms prefer to hire Chinese workers instead of employing the 
local residents, raising concerns among some local communities in relation to these firms 
resource extraction tendency (Alden & Alves 2009). As China is shifting its investment 
portfolio in overseas markets, oil and gas and the mining industries still remain the most 
attractive investment options for Chinese ODI (KPMG 2016). Frankel (2010, p. 34) argues 
that many less-developed countries endowed with natural resources (oil and minerals and 
some crops) are likely to have: “poor institutions, such as corruption, inequality, class 
structure, chronic power struggles, and absence of rule of law and property rights”. Together, 
the empirical evidence on Chinese ODI shows a strong relationship between acceptance of 
political risk, a willingness to engage with institutional voids or weak environments, and 
natural resources extraction (Buckley et al. 2007; Kolstad & Wiig 2012), and in particular 
Ramasamy et al. (2012) argue that POEs are market seekers and SOEs are attracted to 
countries with large natural resources. We therefore hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms that are engaged in resource-seeking and/or market-seeking ODI are 
more likely to report a higher perceived risk.  
2.3. Host country institutional quality and perceived level of risk 
A country’s legal system is an important institutional protector for investors’ legitimate 
interests (Ullah et al. 2018; Adams et al. 2018). La Porta et al. (1998) argue that common law 
                                                          
4 A recent New York Times article, The World According to China,  mapped Chinese investment in high risk 
political and legal regimes, namely, Afghanistan, Angola, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Sierra Leone and North Korea, 
which are mainly avoided by Western investor. See New York Times article at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/24/business/international/the-world-according-to-china-
investment-maps.html  
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systems provide strongest protection for creditors and shareholders’ compared with civil law 
systems. Poor legal protection and poor institutional fabric can lead to corruption, which 
further increases the cost of doing business and negatively affects the flow of foreign 
investments (Blonigen 2005). Empirical research on ODI generally shows a positive 
correlation between the quality of host country institutions and the flow of foreign 
investments (Gani 2007; Stoian 2013). However, empirical evidence is mixed about the 
location decision of Chinese ODI with respect to destination institutional quality. For 
example, Chen et al. (2015) document that Chinese investment is equally directed to strong 
and poor governance regimes, while Buckley et al. (2007) show that Chinese ODI is attracted 
to high risk destinations. Morck et al. (2008) argue that a considerable amount of Chinese 
ODI is located in Asian and African countries with “chronically weak institutions”. They 
further assert that compared with their western counterparts in the overseas markets: 
“Chinese firm are more experienced with such institutional features, and as a result are 
probably far more capable of dealing with burdensome regulations and navigating around the 
opaque political constraints”. Moreover, while the political ties between the Chinese state and 
SOEs cannot obviate the challenges of institutional voids and weak institutional settings, they 
may be useful for marshalling resources, mitigating challenges and creating stability in the 
environment. Generally, the trade deals between China and other countries are carried out at a 
high political level, involving the participation of large SOEs. In contrast, with less political 
backings from the home government POEs are required to carry the cost associated with 
market related research and management of disputes and conflicts, which can be a very 
expensive and daunting process (Huang & Renyong 2014). Consistent with the above 
arguments and  prior ODI literature (Blonigen 2005), we develop the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between the institutional quality of the host country and the 
firms’ perceived risk regarding ODI is negative and varies across firms’ ownership types.  
2.4. Chinese ODI and risk management approaches  
SOEs receive substantial government support, so it can be anticipated that any problems 
encountered in overseas markets would be assisted by the local representatives of the Chinese 
government (for example, Chinese embassies). Given the lack of encouragement and 
government support for POEs (Huang & Renyong 2014), it is expected that POEs will rely 
more on alternative means, such as seeking protection through the host country legal system, 
commercial mechanisms (insurance etc.), and seeking informal support from the Chinese 
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community. As the perceived level of risk is different for Chinese ODI in relation to 
resources-seeking and market-seeking motives, we argue that the risk management 
approaches would also differ accordingly. For example, the trade deals between China and 
less-developed countries in Asia and Africa are often politically driven and such agreements 
are signed and endorsed by the country’s top leadership with political insurance of the 
continuity of such projects.  We therefore develop the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 4: In countries with strong institutional quality and legal systems, firms rely more 
on the quality of legal system and other commercial means (e.g., insurance) to manage the 
risks involved in their ODIs. 
Hypothesis 5: In countries with poor institutional quality, firms rely on support from the host 
country government and the Chinese embassies to manage the risks involved in their ODIs.  
Figure 2 diagrammatically summarises the conceptual framework of our research as 
elaborated above.  
[Figure 2 inserted here] 
3. Research design 
3.1. Data and variables 
Contrary to conventional empirical work on the Chinese ODI, which relies primarily on 
country-level aggregate statistics, we conducted a micro-level survey of firms in China in 
order to collect information on firm-investing behaviour at the individual level. The survey 
was conducted as part of a joint project of China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade (CCPIT), the largest specialist trade promotion association in China, and Zhejiang 
University. The purpose of this survey was to collect information directly from firms which 
are members of CCPIT, so as to better understand the patterns and influencing factors of 
Chinese firms’ overseas direct investment. Questionnaires were sent out to around 1,200 
randomly selected CCPIT members located in 15 provinces or province-equivalent 
municipalities, 5  of which 1,090 questionnaires were returned. Out of these returned 
questionnaires, 289 respondents reported to have had investment abroad.  
The survey included a wide range of questions relating to: firm-specific characteristics (such 
as ownership structure, firm size, and age); ODI motives; preferred destinations for 
                                                          
5 The 15 provinces province-equivalent municipalities are: Guangdong, Sichuan, Ningxia, Shanghai, Tianjin, 
Shandong, Anhui, Zhejiang, Henan, Jiangxi, Hunan, Jiangsu, Fujian, Shanxi, and Xinjiang.  
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investment; the perceived level of risks in the overseas markets; and, how these risks are 
minimised or mitigated. It also distinguished different types of risk a firm may face in ODI: 
those relating to trade and taxation policies; contract enforcements in overseas markets; 
security and political barriers; confiscation of assets in a foreign country; corruption; political 
turbulence and war; and labour relations. Following prior research (Kolstad & Wiig 2012; 
Stoian 2013; Lu et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2015), we combine this micro-level data with 
external measures for host country institutional quality extracted from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators,  which include control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
political stability, rule of law, regulator quality, and voice and accountability. In Figure 3, we 
report the geographical distribution of our sample firms’ top three ODI destinations. We 
observe that developed markets (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and the United 
States of America) remain the most preferred destinations for Chinese investors, as evident 
by the highest number of firms (around 50 and 80) opting for these locations as their top three 
destinations. Other preferences include resource abundant countries, in particular, those with 
weak legal systems and those located in close proximity to China (Algeria, Congo, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, Singapore, and South Africa), while the least preferred 
destinations include Eastern European and East African countries. The geographical 
distribution of Chinese ODI also offers preliminary insights into the perceived motives of 
Chinese ODI in different regions (refer to Hypothesis 2).     
 [Figure 3 inserted here] 
3.2. Estimation strategy 
The key outcome variables used in this research are the ratings of risk perceived by the firms 
surveyed. Respondents rated the perceived risk as one of the following five categories: “very 
low”, “low”, “modest”, “high”, or “very high”. For the ease of quantitative analysis, we code 
these five categories as 1 to 5 respectively, with 1 indicating “very low” risk and 5 “very 
high” risk. It should be noted that the specific assigned value of these risk ratings are not 
intrinsically meaningful. Instead, the numeric values of the risk rating here indicate only the 
ordering of the degree of risk: i.e. a bigger number indicates a higher risk, however, a risk 
rating of 4 does not necessarily imply it is twice as risky as a risk coded 2. Therefore, given 
this ordinal nature of the risk variables, ordinary linear regression methods would lead to bias 
and are thus not suitable here. Instead, we used ordered logit models for the estimation of the 
influencing factors of ODI risks: 
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Pr⁡(𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗 = 𝑖) = Pr(𝑐𝑖−1 < 𝑿𝑗 + 𝜇𝑗 ≤ 𝑐𝑖), 
      
where the probably that firm j perceives the risk to take the value of i (i=1,2,…5) is estimated 
as a linear function of a set of explanatory variables X, a random error term μ. The cut points 
c are the estimated cut off values of the risk score that differentiate the different risk 
categories, where 𝑐0 is −∞, and 𝑐5 is +∞. Here the random error μ is assumed to be of a 
logistic distribution.       
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for factors relating to ODI risks for both SOEs and POEs. 
The mean values for the perceived risk factors indicate that the Chinese ODI risks are mainly 
related to macro-economic conditions of the overseas destinations (SOE=3.182, POE=2.949), 
trade and taxation policies (SOE=2.745, POE=2.715), contract enforcements (SOE=2.741, 
POE=2.462), security and political barriers (SOE=2.574, POE=2.481), confiscation of assets 
by the government (SOE=2.167 POE=2.095), corruption (SOE=2.519, POE=2.269), political 
stability (SOE=2.759, POE=2.536) and labour relations (SOE=2.800, POE=2.560). In terms 
of management of these risks, both SOEs and POEs prefer to seek (a) support from the 
Chinese embassies/Chinese government (SOE=0.800, POE=0.760), (b) managing risks 
through localisation (SOE=0.733, POE=0.616), and (c) relying on host country legal 
institutions to resolve their issues (SOE=0.450, POE=0.406).  
 
4. Results 
The key question of our enquiry was to examine the risks faced by Chinese firms in the 
overseas markets. To investigate this, we tested our hypotheses relating to the perceived level 
of ODI risks in respect of: (a) ownership structure; (b) ODI motives; and, (c) host country 
institutional quality. We also tested how these risks are managed or mitigated by investing 
firms. We carried out our initial analysis to test our first hypothesis regarding whether and 
how the perceived risks vary across firms of different ownership structures (SOEs and POEs). 
To interpret the results from the ordered logit models, the size of the coefficients tells us for a 
one-unit increase in the explanatory variable, how much the log odds would be changed for 
the risk to be rated in category i or above versus other (lower) categories combined. We 
control for firm size category, proxied by a coarse indicator of revenue range, to address the 
concern that firm size could be correlated with their risk perception; in particular, larger firms 
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may be more immune to risks.6 To rule out any bias from unobserved industry-specific 
factors that could influence either, the key explanatory variables, or the dependent variable, 
industry fixed effects are controlled for throughout the regressions.  
The results reported in Table 2 show that the perceived level of risks differ across SOEs and 
POEs. As expected, the universally negative and in some cases statistically significant 
coefficients indicate that most risk factors ODI market risks are rated lower by POEs than by 
SOEs. If we consider risk in the macro-economy for example, the log odds of giving a very 
high risk rating versus lower rating is nearly 0.5 lower for POEs than for SOEs. The same 
applies to host country corruption and labour relations. 
The risk-averse nature of POEs could partly explain this finding (Liu et al. 2008). POEs are 
largely owned by Chinese families and hence their choices of overseas destinations are very 
carefully determined. Moreover, we offer two alternative perspectives about this changing 
attitude of SOEs and POEs. First, SOEs are pushed by the Chinese government to pursue 
their politically driven economic agreements in risky, institutionally weak and void 
destinations (Khanna et al. 2005). Second, capital market imperfections in China (Buckley et 
al. 2007), the special ownership advantage of SOEs, coupled with unconditional support from 
the Chinese government, provide more incentives for SOEs to undergo more riskier projects. 
The results in Table 2 support our first hypothesis that POEs perceived risks of ODI are lower 
compared with SOEs.  
[Table 2 inserted here] 
In Table 3, we investigate whether, and if, how perceived risks of all Chinese ODI firms vary 
according to their investments objectives. We find that market-seeking and resources-seeking 
firms perceive higher risks in overseas markets than firms of other investment motives. One 
obvious explanation could be that Chinese investments are generally directed to risky legal 
and political regimes, enriched with natural resources.  The extraction of natural resources at 
lower costs, domestic politics and conflicts in less developed countries pose greater risks to 
                                                          
6 Owing to the nature of the survey, firms were only asked to reveal the broad range of their annual 
sales revenue. This gives us a categorical indicator of firm revenues: 1 for revenues less than 1 million 
Yuan, 2 for revenue between 1 million Yuan and 10 million Yuan, 3 for between 10 million Yuan and 
100 million Yuan, 4 for between 100 million and 1000 million Yuan, 5 for between 1000 and 10000 
million Yuan, and 6 for revenue above 10000 million Yuan. Summary statistics in Table 1 shows that 
SOEs are on average larger than POEs, although firms are similarly dispersed within their ownership 
category.        
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Chinese installations and workers.7  Among others, the significant coefficients in Table 3 
indicate that for a one-unit increase in market-seeking motive in ODI, the log odds of 
perceiving high risk in security and political barriers is 0.72 higher than perceiving lower risk 
in these areas, suggesting that marketing-seeking investors from China are particularly 
concerned about political risks. For brand-seeking ODI, however, the log odds for perceiving 
higher risks is –0.62 lower than perceiving lower risks, suggesting that ODI driven by 
enhancing their brands in overseas markets are less concerned about security and political 
barriers, implying that the host country environment is relatively less hostile to such 
investments than to resources-seeking investment.8 In contrast, for a one-unit increase in 
resources-seeking ODI, we see a 0.65 increase in the log odds of perceiving high versus low 
risk of host country corruption in overseas markets, suggesting that resources-seeking 
investors are more likely to perceive corruption as a risk factor. The findings in Table 3 lend 
support to our second hypothesis, indicating that resources-seeking and market-seeking ODI 
perceive higher risks compared to ODI seeking for more advanced technology and better 
institutions.  
 [Table 3 inserted here] 
Our literature review highlights how different ownership structures may lead to different 
investments motives and different risks. In the same spirit, we examine in Table 4 the joint 
impact of ownership structure and ODI motives on the perceived level of ODI risks. 
Checking the ownership-specific coefficients of investment motives, the results are generally 
mixed. For brand-seeking ODI, which is defined as firms seeking to enhance their company 
or brand image in the international market through overseas investment, POEs perceive 
consistently lower risks in overseas markets. The finding indicates that brand-seeking 
investments by POEs are generally welcomed in the overseas markets. While investments 
from individuals and private enterprises are encouraged, politicians and governments in 
overseas regions often have nixed views about Chinese ODI, particularly those originating 
from SOEs with a significant stake of the Chinese government.  
                                                          
7 For example, Pakistan has recently deployed 15,000 special security personnel to protect a $46 billion Chinese 
sponsored economic corridor, including the Chinese workers involved in the execution of the project. Details 
can be accessed at http://www.dawn.com/news/1277182.    
8 Summary statistics show that ODI with brand-enhancing motives are mostly in high-income markets with 
good institutional quality. An example of brand-seeking ODI is the Chinese telecom giant, Huawei, which 
currently own 8.3 % market share in Europe. See for example,  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/05/25/chinas-huawei-growing-up-to-become-the-worlds-
number-one-smartphone-brand/#dfdf214589a9  
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[Table 4 inserted here] 
To see how host country intuitional quality plays a role in the perceived level of risks, we 
introduce a firm-specific ODI markets’ institutional quality measure. In developing 
Hypothesis 4, we expect a negative relationship between host country institutional quality 
and the perceived level of risks for Chinese ODI. More precisely, first we employ a principle 
components analysis (PCA) approach by constructing a composite index in order to capture a 
host country’s institutional quality, including a number of factors, such as: control of 
corruption; government effectiveness; political stability; rule of law; regulator quality, and 
voice and accountability. We then take simple average of the institutional quality measures 
across a firm’s destination markets as an indicator of the average institutional quality a firm 
faces in its overseas invested markets.9 According to the results, the models identify that host 
country institutional quality is negatively correlated with perceived level of risks relating to 
(a) host country’s government corruption, and (b) host country’s political turbulence and war. 
The findings in Table 5 are consistent with Hypothesis 4, implying that strong institutions in 
overseas markets signal an assurance to Chinese investors for the political security of their 
investments. The results also signify the mediating role of host country’s institutions in 
dealing with corruption and bureaucracy in overseas markets (Han et al., 2018).    
[Table 5 inserted here] 
In a similar spirit to Table 4, we test whether the relationship between institutional quality 
and perceived risks differs between SOEs and POEs. The results in Table 6 again do not in 
this particular instance produce any statistically significant evidence, implying that 
institutional quality of the destination market is equally relevant for both SOEs and POEs in 
contributing to higher perceived risks associated with political governance and stability. This 
finding however contradicts the general narrative that Chinese investors prefer risky 
destinations (Buckley et al. 2007), less developed countries and countries with weak legal 
systems (Frankel 2010). One possible explanation could be that Chinese investment in 
overseas markets is often highly politically driven, and the close ties between the Chinese 
government and host countries government (often strengthened by bilateral trade agreement) 
put extra pressures on Chinese firms to invest in such regions. Our research thus shows that 
                                                          
9 We also use a weighted average version of this measure with the weight being the share of each market in the 
firm’s ODI portfolio, and the regression results are qualitatively unaffected.  See also some of the robustness 
checks in Appendix.      
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firm-level perception of country-level institution quality may not necessarily coincide with 
the perception of Chinese government.  
 [Table 6 inserted here] 
We now examine whether the choice of risk management approaches varies according to the 
institutional quality of the host country.10 Since firms are allowed to make multiple choices, 
multinomial logit regressions are not suitable here. Instead, we create binary dummies for 
each approach and run separate logit regressions with each dummy being the dependent 
variable. Not surprisingly, what is apparent in Table 7 is that stronger institutional 
environment (e.g. rule of law) reduces Chinese firms’ (both SOEs and POEs) dependency on 
own security measures and host country government. For a one-standard-deviation increase 
in average institutional quality (about 2.1 from summary statistics Table 1), the log odds of 
relying on improving own security or host country government as risk management 
approaches reduces by around 0.4. This also accords well with the result for commercial 
means as a risk management approach: as a result of an increase in host countries’ 
institutional quality, standard commercial means (e.g. insurance against potential losses) 
becomes more of common practice in countering risks. Together, these findings highlight the 
positive role played by host country’s institutions in the risk assessments by Chinese firms, 
implying that good institutions could significantly save some risk-associated costs. These 
findings broadly confirm Hypotheses 4 and 5, implying that legal systems and standard 
commercial means are the popular risk management choices of Chinese ODI.   
[Table 7 inserted here] 
Naturally, it is interesting to see how risk management approaches do, or do not, differ 
between SOEs and POEs. To do so, we estimate the interacted effect of ownership type and 
destination market institutional quality. The findings from Table 8 show that, in terms of risk 
management, POEs and SOEs do not differ in a systematic way in the impact of institutional 
quality on the choice of risk management approaches. In other words, host country institution 
quality plays a consistent role for firms of different ownership types, implying that market 
institution is important in certain areas regardless of Chinese firms’ political background. 
                                                          
10 Due to rather limited statistical power as a result of small subsample size for very finely defined risk 
management approaches and investment motives, the results for ODI motives are not reported but are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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One reason for the insignificant results according to the ownership structure could be that risk 
management strategies and firm-level internal control mechanisms are globally converging, 
and Chinese firms are not an exception to this.   
[Table 8 inserted here] 
We carried out a number of robustness tests in order to determine whether the results still 
hold after including alternative measures for country-level institutional quality. Instead of 
using a simple measure of institutional quality, we calculated the average quality of invested 
countries’ institutions weighted by each country weight in proportion to a firm’s total 
investment. Reported in Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix, the signs and statistical significances 
of key variables are broadly stable after taking into account the share of each destination in 
the firm’s investment portfolio when computing the firm-specific average destination 
institutional quality. These findings accord with Hypotheses 4 and 5, where we expect that in 
countries with strong legal systems (developed economies) Chinese investors rely more on 
the quality of legal system of the host country, and in countries with weak legal systems 
Chinese investors seek support more from the host government and Chinese embassies. We 
checked the robustness of our findings in Appendix tables A1 and A2. We included a 
weighted measure of institutional quality constructed as the average quality of invested 
countries’ institutions weighted by each country’s weight in firm’s total investment. On the 
whole, our main findings relating to the risk management strategies of Chinese ODIs hold in 
the robustness tests.  
5. Conclusions and Implications 
This paper advances our understanding about the perceived risks faced by the Chinese ODI 
and the influencing factors. Risk assessment is an integral part of a firm’s corporate strategy 
and firms around the world are increasingly reporting about their level of risk exposure and 
how these risks are managed or mitigated. While the international business literature provides 
some insights into the different types of risks that firms may face in an overseas market, our 
study provides the first evidence on the specific investment risks perceived by Chinese 
investors, especially with respect to (a) their ownership structure, (b) ODI motives, and (c) 
the quality of host countries’ institutions. First, our findings show that ownership structure 
plays a significant role in explaining the risk perception differences across Chinese firms. In 
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general, POEs perceive lower risks compared to their state-owned counterparts. Second, it is 
found that resources-seeking and market-seeking Chinese ODI companies perceive higher 
risks in overseas destinations. Third, we also present evidence that quality of institutions in a 
host country is one of the key factors in shaping the perceived risk exposure of Chinese POEs 
and SOEs. Specifically, in regimes with strong legal environments, Chinese firms perceive a 
lower level of risks relating to security and host countries’ government corruption. It is 
implied that the effectiveness of judicial institutions in developed countries (particularly 
those in the Western world) offers more incentive for Chinese firms to use standard 
commercial means to pursue their business objectives. Moreover, the sum of these findings 
also point at the ‘realpolitik’ of the contemporary China context wherein POEs, in essence, 
do not receive the same support and access to resources as SOEs. Therefore, as a form of 
necessity POEs are actually pushed towards ODI as a form of business expansion. They, view 
this, relatively speaking, is less risk prone than simply operating in the resource constrained 
environment of their China base. Indeed, it may often also be the case that the institutional 
quality of operational environment in the ODI context may also be more conducive to their 
business operations. These findings have practical implications for policy makers and 
particularly firms seeking to “go global”. Currently, the Chinese government has a more 
prescriptive approach in advising firms in terms of choosing overseas investment destinations 
and the general risks associated with each region. However, firms with different ownership 
structure and investment motives perceive unique types of risks which are often not fully 
captured by national level risk registers maintained by the Chinese government in facilitating 
overseas investment. It is thus important to recognise the heterogeneity of Chinese firms in 
the above aspects when evaluating their overseas investment considerations, In particular, a 
firm-level study helps reveal some influential politico-economic powers that are often hidden 
in a country- or industry-level study. Together, these findings not only provide preliminary 
insights about the “Chinese way” of managing risks in the international markets, but also, 
importantly, uncover the interacted impact of the firm ownership background, investment 
motives and destination institutional quality in the risk perceptions of Chinese ODI firms, 
adding a detailed, micro perspective to the existing literature about the behaviour of Chinese 
overseas investment. In addition, a further implication concerns that as POEs are typically 
demonstrating less risk averse behaviour in relation to ODI than SOEs it should be 
recognised that, by being pushed towards ODI, POEs are, in fact, accumulating significant 
learning and awareness in relation to these forms of activities. Policy makers should take note 
of this and find ways of accumulating and assimilating these developing forms of knowledge. 
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6. Future research 
Future studies may explore how firm-level internal corporate governance mechanisms and 
boardroom quality (gender diversity, managerial ownership, independent directors’ 
representation on corporate boards, and directors’ political connectedness) would affect the 
degree of internationalisation and the level of risk exposure of Chinese firms. Finally, from a 
methodology perspective, a content analysis approach, for example, may provide useful 
insights about how the different type of risks faced by Chinese multinationals are disclosed in 
their annual reports. Moreover, development of, and engagement with, a wider range of 
additional methodological approaches (for example, qualitative vignettes and cases) would 
enrich and provide a broader range of insights on ODI and complement extant research. This 
may somehow overcome the limitations associated with traditional survey methods 
frequently used in the international business literature. 
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Figure 1. The Six Economic Corridors that Connect China with the rest of the world. Source: 
Adapted from Eurasia News Online (2017). 
 
  
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual framework. 
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Figure 3. Geographical Distribution of Firms’ Top Three ODI Destinations (Numbers indicate the number of firms who selected the country as one of its top three 
ODI destinations). Source: authors’ own survey.  
  
 
 
28 
 
Table 1  
Summary statistics of key variables.  
                                SOEs                                 POEs 
Variable  Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.  Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
Perceived ODI market risk in:            
Macro economy 55 3.182 0.905 1 5  195 2.949 1.044 1 5 
Taxation policy 55 2.745 1.075 1 5  186 2.715 1.029 1 5 
Contract enforcement  54 2.741 1.136 1 5  182 2.462 1.111 1 5 
Security and political barriers  54 2.574 0.964 1 5  181 2.481 1.093 1 5 
Confiscation by government 54 2.167 0.966 1 5  179 2.095 1.074 1 5 
Government corruption 54 2.519 0.885 1 5  182 2.269 1.066 1 5 
Political turbulence and war 54 2.759 1.302 1 5  183 2.536 1.261 1 5 
Labour relations 55 2.800 0.911 1 5  182 2.560 1.100 1 6 
            
Indicators of risk management approaches 
taken: 
           
1 if relying on Chinese embassy or gov 60 0.800 0.403 0 1  229 0.760 0.428 0 1 
1 if relying on local Chinese community 60 0.300 0.462 0 1  229 0.279 0.450 0 1 
1 if relying on commercial means 60 0.400 0.494 0 1  229 0.376 0.485 0 1 
1 if relying on localisation 60 0.733 0.446 0 1  229 0.616 0.487 0 1 
1 if relying on improving security 60 0.250 0.437 0 1  229 0.175 0.381 0 1 
1 if relying on host country gov 60 0.317 0.469 0 1  229 0.293 0.456 0 1 
1 if relying on host country legal protection 60 0.450 0.502 0 1  229 0.406 0.492 0 1 
1 if relying on international organisations 60 0.083 0.279 0 1  229 0.052 0.223 0 1 
Other variables:            
Institutional quality (average) 55 0.032 2.103 -3.766 2.815  218 0.035 2.165 -4.761 2.885 
Firm size category 60 4.500 1.214 1 6  220 3.568 1.282 1 6 
Notes: this table reports summary statistics of key variables for SOEs and POEs separately. Source: authors’ own survey.    
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Table 2 
Perceived risks across investor ownership types. 
 Perceived 
risk of recent 
ODI in 
destination, 
macro 
economy 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
trade and 
taxation 
policies 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
contract 
enforcement 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
security and 
political 
barriers 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
confiscation 
by 
government 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
government 
corruption 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
political 
turbulence 
and war 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
labour 
relations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
POE -0.489* 0.029 -0.485 -0.304 -0.296 -0.576** -0.346 -0.379 
 (0.295) (0.330) (0.325) (0.287) (0.297) (0.291) (0.326) (0.304) 
Industry fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 243 234 230 230 228 231 232 231 
Pseudo R-squared 0.012 0.014 0.020 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.016 0.010 
Note: this table reports how POEs and SOEs have different perceived risks, using results from ordered logit regressions. Estimated coefficients are in log odds ratios. Industry fixed 
effects and firm size (revenue) category are controlled for in all models. Source: authors’ own survey. 
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Table 3 
Perceived risks across investor ownership types and ODI motives. 
 Perceived 
risk of 
recent ODI 
in 
destination, 
macro 
economy 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
trade and 
taxation 
policies 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
contract 
enforcemen
t 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
security and 
political 
barriers 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
confiscation 
by 
government 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
government 
corruption 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
political 
turbulence 
and war 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
labour 
relations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ODI motive (policy) -0.095 -0.103 -0.048 -0.058 -0.280 -0.052 0.242 -0.236 
 (0.202) (0.210) (0.246) (0.234) (0.263) (0.233) (0.215) (0.218) 
         
ODI motive (market) 0.559*** 0.516** 0.488** 0.723*** 0.440* 0.302 0.465* 0.129 
 (0.213) (0.221) (0.233) (0.251) (0.250) (0.243) (0.247) (0.209) 
         
ODI motive (technology) 0.312* -0.177 -0.166 0.049 -0.151 -0.270* -0.295 0.259 
 (0.184) (0.165) (0.164) (0.182) (0.170) (0.156) (0.193) (0.172) 
         
ODI motive (brand) -0.227 -0.434** 0.099 -0.615*** -0.310 -0.289 -0.029 -0.122 
 (0.196) (0.211) (0.208) (0.237) (0.243) (0.219) (0.231) (0.211) 
         
ODI motive (institutions) -0.225 0.188 -0.157 -0.111 0.212 0.027 -0.200 0.009 
 (0.171) (0.179) (0.177) (0.183) (0.204) (0.161) (0.222) (0.173) 
         
ODI motive (resources) 0.269* 0.406** 0.398** 0.530*** 0.446** 0.652*** 0.511** 0.255 
 (0.162) (0.179) (0.202) (0.195) (0.224) (0.225) (0.209) (0.216) 
         
POE -0.655** -0.006 -0.420 -0.361 -0.315 -0.527* -0.330 -0.500 
 (0.318) (0.368) (0.347) (0.315) (0.331) (0.317) (0.341) (0.339) 
Own. and ind. fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 229 223 220 219 217 219 221 221 
Pseudo R-squared 0.053 0.053 0.051 0.068 0.047 0.051 0.057 0.029 
Note: this table reports how perceived risks vary across investor ownership types and ODI motives, using results from ordered logit regressions. Estimated coefficients are in log odds 
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ratios. Ownership fixed effects, industry fixed effects and firm size category are controlled for in all models. Source: authors’ own survey. 
 
 
Table 4 
Perceived risks: the interacted role of investor ownership type and ODI motive. 
 Perceived 
risk of recent 
ODI in 
destination, 
macro 
economy 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
trade and 
taxation 
policies 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
contract 
enforcement 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
security and 
political 
barriers 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
confiscation 
by 
government 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
government 
corruption 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
political 
turbulence 
and war 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
labour 
relations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
POE 0.356 -2.273 -2.136 2.251 1.366 1.149 0.300 -0.205 
 (1.777) (2.242) (2.201) (1.599) (1.833) (1.633) (1.854) (1.854) 
         
POE* ODI motive (policy) 0.043 0.543 1.202* -0.237 -0.286 0.242 -0.641 -0.101 
 (0.567) (0.482) (0.647) (0.526) (0.768) (0.479) (0.502) (0.518) 
         
POE* ODI motive (market) -0.465 -0.507 0.466 0.370 0.406 -0.580 0.054 0.445 
 (0.656) (0.616) (1.011) (0.845) (0.788) (0.624) (0.786) (0.654) 
         
POE* ODI motive (technology) 0.316 0.398 0.599 0.574 0.347 0.117 -0.058 0.655* 
 (0.451) (0.388) (0.415) (0.349) (0.377) (0.297) (0.330) (0.360) 
         
POE* ODI motive (brand) -0.362 -0.531 -0.872 -0.902 -1.086* -0.521 -0.022 -1.427*** 
 (0.710) (0.548) (0.673) (0.609) (0.659) (0.557) (0.800) (0.554) 
         
POE*ODI motive (institutions) -0.130 -0.202 -0.260 -0.442 0.140 -0.568* -0.999*** 0.136 
 (0.351) (0.402) (0.511) (0.342) (0.370) (0.317) (0.385) (0.365) 
         
POE*ODI motive (resources) 0.427 1.073** -0.767 0.065 0.241 0.977** 1.714*** 0.548 
 (0.459) (0.476) (0.575) (0.412) (0.510) (0.482) (0.497) (0.458) 
         
ODI motive (policy) -0.178 -0.539 -1.061* 0.078 -0.068 -0.266 0.770* -0.214 
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 (0.521) (0.399) (0.591) (0.456) (0.712) (0.381) (0.441) (0.437) 
         
ODI motive (market) 0.925 0.911 0.106 0.379 0.020 0.750 0.464 -0.341 
 (0.600) (0.560) (0.960) (0.793) (0.733) (0.562) (0.740) (0.602) 
         
ODI motive (technology) 0.134 -0.493 -0.647* -0.277 -0.335 -0.328 -0.216 -0.144 
 (0.368) (0.340) (0.382) (0.246) (0.298) (0.217) (0.246) (0.276) 
         
ODI motive (brand) 0.031 -0.009 0.910 0.075 0.574 0.110 -0.056 1.032** 
 (0.668) (0.493) (0.631) (0.542) (0.616) (0.498) (0.758) (0.470) 
         
ODI motive (institutions) -0.152 0.321 0.009 0.180 0.081 0.406* 0.427 -0.156 
 (0.260) (0.344) (0.473) (0.251) (0.276) (0.243) (0.280) (0.276) 
         
ODI motive (resources) -0.073 -0.466 1.035* 0.508 0.241 -0.052 -0.768* -0.187 
 (0.413) (0.423) (0.530) (0.337) (0.445) (0.395) (0.424) (0.363) 
         
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 229 223 220 219 217 219 221 221 
Pseudo R-squared 0.057 0.069 0.068 0.080 0.055 0.066 0.085 0.045 
Note: this table reports the interacted roles of investor ownership type and ODI motive in shaping perceived risks, using results from ordered logit regressions. Estimated 
coefficients are in log odds ratios. Industry fixed effects and firm size categories are controlled for in all models. Source: authors’ own survey. 
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Table 5 
Perceived risks by investor ownership type and host country institutional quality. 
 Perceived risk of 
recent ODI in 
destination, macro 
economy 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
trade and 
taxation 
policies 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
contract 
enforcement 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
security and 
political 
barriers 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
confiscation 
by 
government 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
government 
corruption 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
political 
turbulence 
and war 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
labour 
relations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Institutional quality 0.036 -0.017 -0.042 0.058 -0.020 -0.213*** -0.201*** 0.075 
 (0.065) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.055) (0.058) (0.061) (0.059) 
         
POE -0.571* 0.048 -0.613* -0.438 -0.366 -0.599** -0.310 -0.499 
 (0.301) (0.348) (0.358) (0.304) (0.316) (0.301) (0.337) (0.323) 
         
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 234 225 221 222 220 223 224 223 
Pseudo R-squared 0.013 0.015 0.024 0.015 0.013 0.034 0.034 0.014 
Note: this table reports how perceived risks vary across investor ownership types and host country institutional quality, using results from ordered logit regressions. Estimated 
coefficients are in log odds ratios. Industry fixed effects are controlled for in all models. Source: authors’ own survey. 
 
  
 
 
34 
 
Table 6 
Perceived risks: the interacted role of investor ownership type and host country institutional quality. 
 Perceived 
risk of 
recent ODI 
in 
destination, 
macro 
economy 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
trade and 
taxation 
policies 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
contract 
enforcement 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
security 
and 
political 
barriers 
Perceived risk 
of ODI in 
destination, 
confiscation 
by 
government 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
government 
corruption 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
political 
turbulence 
and war 
Perceived 
risk of ODI 
in 
destination, 
labour 
relations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
POE -0.602* 0.015 -0.627* -0.490 -0.370 -0.593* -0.337 -0.540* 
 (0.309) (0.353) (0.366) (0.311) (0.313) (0.305) (0.338) (0.328) 
         
Institutional quality -0.044 -0.113 -0.081 -0.094 -0.043 -0.195** -0.315** -0.070 
 (0.120) (0.115) (0.151) (0.117) (0.104) (0.098) (0.134) (0.126) 
         
POE*Institutional quality 0.103 0.124 0.049 0.198 0.030 -0.023 0.143 0.186 
 (0.142) (0.133) (0.169) (0.137) (0.122) (0.117) (0.149) (0.141) 
         
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 234 225 221 222 220 223 224 223 
Pseudo R-squared 0.014 0.016 0.024 0.019 0.013 0.034 0.035 0.017 
Note: this table reports the interacted roles of investor ownership type and host country institutional quality in shaping perceived risks, using results from ordered logit regressions. 
Estimated coefficients are in log odds ratios. Industry fixed effects and firm size categories are controlled for in all models. Source: authors’ own survey. 
 
  
 
 
35 
 
Table 7 
Risk management approaches by investor ownership type and host country institutional quality. 
 
Managing risks by relying on 
 Chinese 
embassy or 
government 
Local Chinese 
community 
Commercial 
means such 
as purchase 
of insurance 
Localisation 
through 
employing 
local 
workers  
Improving 
security 
facilities 
Host 
country 
government 
Host 
country 
legal 
protection 
International 
organisations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Institutional quality -0.059 -0.097 0.191*** -0.041 -0.211** -0.216*** 0.051 0.071 
 (0.073) (0.071) (0.067) (0.064) (0.083) (0.070) (0.065) (0.137) 
         
POE -0.090 -0.286 0.350 -0.493 -0.378 0.008 -0.118 -0.209 
 (0.372) (0.359) (0.387) (0.363) (0.369) (0.381) (0.350) (0.579) 
         
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 248 
Pseudo R-squared 0.038 0.051 0.100 0.048 0.068 0.086 0.044 0.113 
Note: this table reports how risk management approaches vary across investor ownership types and host country institutional quality, using results from logit regressions. Estimated 
coefficients are in log odds ratios. Industry fixed effects and firm size category are controlled for in all models. Source: authors’ own survey. 
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Table 8 
Risk management approaches: the interacted roles of investor ownership type and host country institutional quality. 
 
Managing risks by relying on 
 Chinese 
embassy or 
government 
Local 
Chinese 
community 
Commercial 
means such as 
purchase of 
insurance 
Localisation 
through 
employing 
local workers  
Improving 
security 
facilities 
Host country 
government 
Host 
country 
legal 
protection 
International 
organisations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
POE -0.078 -0.276 0.356 -0.487 -0.347 0.018 -0.131 -0.249 
 (0.375) (0.354) (0.386) (0.365) (0.380) (0.388) (0.350) (0.596) 
         
Institutional quality -0.024 0.005 0.207 -0.002 -0.294* -0.263 -0.009 0.008 
 (0.171) (0.138) (0.151) (0.161) (0.156) (0.161) (0.138) (0.210) 
         
POE*Institutional quality -0.045 -0.132 -0.021 -0.048 0.110 0.061 0.078 0.096 
 (0.192) (0.160) (0.167) (0.178) (0.182) (0.180) (0.155) (0.278) 
         
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 248 
Pseudo R-squared 0.038 0.054 0.100 0.048 0.069 0.086 0.045 0.114 
Note: this table reports the interacted roles of investor ownership type and host country institutional quality in shaping risk management approaches, using results from logit 
regressions. Estimated coefficients are in log odds ratios. Industry fixed effects and firm size category are controlled for in all models. Source: authors’ own survey. 
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Appendices 
 
Table A1 
Robustness checks - risk management approaches by investor ownership type and country institutional quality, using alternative measure of institutional quality. 
 
Managing risks by relying on 
 Chinese 
embassy or 
government 
Local 
Chinese 
community 
Commercial 
means such 
as purchase 
of insurance 
Localisation 
through 
employing 
local workers  
Improving 
security 
facilities 
Host 
country 
government 
Host 
country 
legal 
protection 
International 
organisations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Institutional quality weighted -0.065 0.118 -0.062 -0.258 -0.059 -0.576** 0.002 0.878 
 (0.173) (0.195) (0.160) (0.191) (0.229) (0.228) (0.174) (1.105) 
         
POE -0.662 -2.856*** 0.502 -1.735** -0.536 -0.025 0.041 -36.438 
 (0.748) (1.027) (0.687) (0.838) (0.894) (0.796) (0.718) (28.235) 
         
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 58 37 58 58 40 58 51 32 
Pseudo R-squared 0.119 0.292 0.051 0.168 0.236 0.298 0.026 0.571 
Note: this table reports the association between institutional quality and risk management approaches, using results from logit regressions. Estimated coefficients are in log odds 
ratios. Industry fixed effects and firm size category are controlled for in all models. Source: authors’ own survey. 
 
  
 
 
38 
 
Table A2  
Robustness checks - risk management approaches: the interacted roles of investor ownership type and host country institutional quality, using alternative measure 
of institutional quality. 
 
Managing risks by relying on 
 Chinese 
embassy or 
government 
Local 
Chinese 
community 
Commercial 
means such 
as purchase 
of insurance 
Localisation 
through 
employing 
local 
workers  
Improving 
security 
facilities 
Host 
country 
government 
Host 
country 
legal 
protection 
International 
organisations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
POE -0.616 -1.491* 0.489 -1.421* -0.787 0.763 0.325 -0.545 
 (0.792) (0.768) (0.639) (0.849) (0.766) (0.679) (0.653) (1.110) 
         
Institutional quality weighted 0.198 0.240 -0.315 0.056 -0.073 -1.384* -0.205 -0.701* 
 (0.457) (0.410) (0.391) (0.414) (0.429) (0.794) (0.395) (0.388) 
         
POE*Institutional quality weighted -0.317 -0.020 0.264 -0.262 -0.065 1.125 0.328 0.721 
 (0.487) (0.499) (0.425) (0.448) (0.513) (0.814) (0.431) (0.621) 
         
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 58 54 58 58 52 58 58 37 
Pseudo R-squared 0.019 0.083 0.016 0.074 0.030 0.136 0.014 0.089 
Note: this table reports how the relationship between institutional quality and risk management approaches differs between POEs and SOEs, using results from logit regressions. 
Institutional quality is the average quality of invested countries' institutions weighted by each country's weight in firm's total investment. Estimated coefficients are in log odds 
ratios. Industry fixed effects and firm size category are controlled for in all models. Source: authors’ own survey. 
 
